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This article is a phased achievement of the National Social Science Fund's major project “Marxism and the Trend of Contemporary Social Political Philosophy†(Project No. 12ZD106).
Expressed as abstract idealism, or as the same abstract empiricism. Therefore, this thesis attempts to explain the essence of Marx's realistic view through the philosophical path, and explores the ideological basis of understanding the Chinese road on the basis of these essentials.
Marx's view of reality, although influenced by Feuerbach, still has the most essential connection with Hegel's concept of reality. This is not only because Hegel decisively changed the connotation of the concept of reality itself, "his unprecedented promotion of the real, current world to the content of philosophy", but also because Hegel's concept of reality embraces the experience of experience. In the sense of the content, it leads the disintegration of speculative idealism in a certain sense, and restricts the theoretical trend of "reality" after the disintegration. 1 In Hegel's philosophy, the most basic and most concise definition of the concept of reality is expressed as: reality is the unity of essence and reality. This means that “reality†is not only understood as the essence, but also as reality.
The diversity in reality is their truth. "2 If we say that in the previous metaphysics, the real "reality" was only divided into the essential field and separated from the phenomenon field and its diversity, then Hegel's concept of reality is different, it requires Essentially speculatively built into existence. Similarly, in the current opinion of the vulgar, "reality" simply means a simple set of real (ready-made "facts", meaning that it can be directly given in perception. Our things, then Hegel's concept of reality requires that the real world be speculated in the essence. In this sense, unless we can penetrate into the essence, otherwise, reality is impossible. Come and see us; there is no real reality here, at most there is only pure existence. Therefore, in Hegel's logic, the concept of reality belongs to "essence as the unity of essence and reality, "reality" It is also a system of internal and external. In Hegel's view, "in essence, there is existence as existence; the relationship between existence and essence is further formed into a contrast between inside and outside." 3 In the most general sense of this contrast, the inner is the essence, outside Yes, and reality is the direct formation of internal and external. In this sense, the performance of real things is the same as the real thing itself. "So the real thing is still the essential thing in its performance. It can also be said that only when it has direct external reality, the real thing is the essential thing." 4 The concept of reality is in philosophy The significance of the great revolution in history is that the content of philosophy is reality, the content of the world or the experience of reality, and such content is for the philosophy of Karlovite: a revolutionary break from Hegel to Nietzsche’s 19th century thinking. , Li Qiu zero translation, Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 2006, p. 184.
Hegel: The Journal of Logic, translated by Yang Yi, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976, p. 177.
Hegel: Little Logic, He Lin Translated, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1980, p. 295.
It is essential. Therefore, philosophy must be consistent with reality and experience. The highest purpose of philosophy is to confirm the agreement between thought and experience: "It can even be said that the agreement between philosophy and experience can at least be regarded as the external touchstone for testing philosophical truth." As for the great changes and positive consequences of this philosophical content, as long as Hegel's legal philosophy is compared with Kant or Feuerbach's moral philosophy, a general overview can be formed.
More importantly, in Hegel's philosophy, reality is not only the essence and the existence, the internal and external, but also the unfolding process, which is the inevitability expressed in the process of development. This means that reality is truly historic. Engels quoted Hegel's famous saying when comparing the "existing" and "reality" to clarify the fundamental difference between the two. "Reality shows inevitability in the process of its development." 2 This means: reality is not ready-made, stiff. On the contrary, as a whole, reality is a kind of generation relative to the fixed existence of individual things, which is a precondition for things to be proved to be part of the integration process. In a word, the reality is purely historical, and it is always carried out for historical purposes. In this way, as Lukács said, the problem of reality emerged in Hegel's new face: "Generating the truth expressed as being, the process is expressed as the truth of things. This means that historical development The tendency constitutes a higher reality than the empirical facts. ''3 In other words, the reality concept is oriented here not only for generation, process, but especially for things that are inevitable in the process of development. As an essential aspect, inevitability In the understanding of the concept of reality, it immediately leads to a distinction between “reality†and “accidental reality.†4 When this distinction generally takes reality and just fleeting, When the accidental reality is opened separately, it also distinguishes what is becoming a reality in the historical process from the accidental reality that has lost its inevitability but still exists. It is in the latter meaning that é¡Fest The arguments of Fellers are full of history. 5 It is almost impossible to explain what it is: such a realistic concept for a highly nervous historical
After generalizing the main provisions and essential features of Hegel's concept of reality, it is necessary to further examine the ontological basis of this concept. The question to be investigated here is that Hegel's concept of reality is to build Hegel: Small Logic, p. 43; see also page 53.
Lukács: History and Class Consciousness on Marx's Dialectics, Du Zhangzhi, et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996, pp. 268-269.
See Hegel: Little Logic, p. 44.
With regard to this historicity, Heidegger’s statement is: “Things of thought are historical to Hegel, and this is historical in the sense of events. The process characteristics of events occur by existence. The dialectic determines." (Selected by Sun Zhouxing: Heidegger's Selected Works, Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 1996, p. 822) Based on what the ontological basis is based on, the answer is: such a basis is called absolute idealism. Doctrine. It means: First, the ultimate basis of the so-called reality is absolute, entity, and God. If reality itself contains essential aspects, then the essence of essence is this absolute entity. In this sense, the entity or God, as the ultimate reality, is the only real reality. As Hegel said, in terms of philosophy, it is fixed in general, part is phenomenon, and only part is reality. ''1 Second, this absolute entity should be grasped as the subject at the same time. The primary proposition of psychophenomenology is "absolutely the concept of the subject." According to this concept, “the key to cutting the problem lies in not only understanding and expressing the real thing or truth as an entity, but also understanding and expressing it as the subject.†2 In this sense, the ontological basis of reality is the absolute subject. . If the subject in general is thoughts, ideas, etc., then the absolute subject is the idea of ​​thinking, the concept of concept, that is, philosophy, reason, and absolute reason. Therefore, the simple proposition in Hegel's philosophy of law "everything that is rational is real; everything that is realistic is rational" 3 is taken for granted. Third, it is precisely in such an ontology that it is because both rationality and reality are based on the absolute absolute rationality. This basis implies the objectivity of thought: thought is not just "our thought" (ie, the rationality of self-consciousness), but also "the self of things" (ie, reality, the existence of reason). Therefore, Hegel constantly criticizes the abstract rationality that separates the idea from the reality, and stipulates the object of philosophy as the idea that the reality of the existing existence. 4 It is not difficult to see that the ontological foundation of such a realistic concept first contains a Platonic step, and it also brings truth, reality or essence into the super-perceive world and belongs to the idea. In such a more general metaphysical framework, the real reality or essence of a thing is that it is more or less "divided". However, for Hegel, reality is not only the essence but also the reality. If the idea is the only ontological basis of reality, then it must not only be the essence of the real thing, but also let the reality as reality. Hegelian philosophy offers this kind of "creation": if Spinoza's entity is a dead entity or "wireless darkness", then the entity as the subject is not only an infinite matrix, but also Unlimited function. Marx once explained the function of this kind of creation in the most shallow comparison: If apples, pears, and strawberries are actually "like entities", then how can the general fruit behave as an apple sometimes as a pear? Or strawberry 昵, "because 'fruit' is not zombie, indifferent, Hegel: Spiritual phenomenology, He Lin, Beijing, Commercial Press, 1979, p. 10.
Hegel: Principles of Legal Philosophy, translated by Zhang Qitai, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1961, p. 11.
The essence of quiescence is a living, self-differentiated, active nature. ''1 as the essence of the "fruit"
Determine yourself as apples, pears, strawberries, etc., and the difference between them is the self-differentiation of "fruits"; these differences make various special fruits become the "fruits of the "fruits" process." In this series The 'fruit' in each link gives itself a more developed and more vivid set, until it is finally a 'general' of all fruits and a living unity. "2 Therefore, in Hegel, because the absolute (entity) is understood as the subject, the internal process and the absolute personality, so the absolute point of view is also the "absolute method." It is not a form without content. The method, but the self-activity of the absolute subject, that is, the process of self-expansion, self-differentiation, and self-regulation of the concept is the dialectic of speculation, that is, the whole embodiment of the self-realization of the concept.
Reality, as the concept of self-realization, is externalized or manifested in the concept of existence, so it is implemented in a dialectic of speculation; this implementation is also the embodiment of reality itself. Here, dialectics means nothing more than the development of reality itself and thus the specific program of thinking to grasp reality. Therefore, in Hegel's view, not only is reality itself specific, but the path of thought deep in reality must also be concrete. On the one hand, "reality, as a specific category, contains the preceding categories and their differences, and therefore is their development. 3 In this regard, reality and inevitability are set, but they are not abstract. Set up, but "the specific things that are done by themselves." On the other hand, the external reflection of abstract thoughts, the intellectuality of form, etc. cannot reach the real reality at all, because such thoughts are completely non-critical and not free. "The idea of ​​true freedom is itself concrete, and it is the idea; and in terms of the universality of thought, it is philosophy or absolute." 4 It is in accordance with the specific program of this realistic concept that Hegel most resolutely opposes subjective thinking and external reflection. As Lukács and Gadamer said, Hegel deliberately struggled with "reflexive philosophy" for a lifetime, and opposed his entire philosophical approach, namely, process and concreteness, dialectics, and history. Therefore, the most distinctive feature of speculative philosophy is the constant and sometimes even harsh criticism of reflective philosophy. Hegel sees pure external reflection as a pathological manifestation of romanticism and its weak nature. 5 Thus, in Hegel, the principle of the foundation and orientation of the most essential essence of the concept of reality is: the absolute concept and its specific program. Just as “reality†is the basis of its ontology in absolute ideas, he is also essentially oriented in the process of speculation. It is because of this foundation and orientation that Hegel often makes a narrative of grasping the real thing in the speculative narrative. This kind of exposition in the speculative elaboration will induce the reader to speculate. Explain as Lukaqi: History and Class Consciousness on Marx's Dialectics, p. 67; Gadamer: Reality''. 1 Marx's view of reality first manifests itself as an ontology of Hegel's concept of reality Criticism, more holistically speaking, manifests itself as a critical separation from Hegel's speculative philosophy. Such an ontological critique was originally inspired and influenced by Feuerbach, and this kind of inspiration and influence is indeed Not insignificant.
Essentially important to Marx's view of reality is that Feuerbach has literally subverted Hegel's concept of reality on the ontology. Reality is by no means an "incarnation" in the realm of the essence of ideas, just as Hegel once called emotions, beliefs or representations, etc., the "incarnation" of thinking.
The same is true; 2 the scale of real things is first of all perceptual reality, and as a perceptual reality, "reality" directly manifests itself as what it is. In a word, reality is not the idea of ​​projection in reality, but directly the existence of sensibility. One of the "great feats" that Marx cited in the economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844 is: "He denies the affirmation of something based on himself and actively based on himself and the self-proclaimed thing that is absolutely certain. Negation is opposite. '3 Here, the former refers to the direct perceptual reality, and the latter refers to the speculative reality of the intermediary. Therefore, when Feuerbach opposes the two, this opposition means reality. The true essence is that if we can talk about "essence" here, it is sensibility, not the inevitability expressed in the process of speculative thinking. The reality is perceptual and concrete, and it is never reflected in the concreteness of speculative thinking. Feuerbach It is claimed that Hegel’s dialectic of perceptual certainty discards the actual and individual “one†in the things of general logic, and makes the latter the truth of the former; but in the true sense, the latter is only a word, and Only the former is a thing. Therefore, the secret of existence does not show the thinking of the general, but the intuitiveness, feeling and lust of the sensibility; only Therefore, love means that an object exists outside our mind. The true ontology proves that there is no other proof of existence other than love. "4 Feuerbach's principle of reality, which is oriented by perceptuality and objectivity (objectivity means the reality of the perceptual subject), is not only specific to Hegelian philosophy, but generally to the whole philosophy of metaphysics, ie Platonism. The form in which philosophy is completed is Hegel's "speculative theology", because metaphysics has given itself theological nature from the beginning. The fundamental establishment of philosophical metaphysics lies in: (1) the perceptual world ( The metaphysical world is strictly separated from and opposed to the super-perceived world (the metaphysical); (2) the reality, the truth, or the essence is only attributed to the super-sensing world rather than to the perceptual world; (3) if it is in the perceptual world Things can be called reality in a certain sense, just because they "divide" the idea of ​​a super-sense world. Therefore, just as in theology, super-sensing things (God) are realistic and infinite. The sensible things are unrealistic and finite. In philosophy, super-sensible reasoning makes sensible things in an abstract way. 1 In this sense, Feuerbach highlights reality as sensibility, thus opposing the metaphysical super-sensing world of philosophy as a whole. "As God of God, God as a spiritual entity or an abstract entity, that is, a non-human, non-sensible entity that can only be accepted as rational or rational and as an object of reason, is nothing else, but the essence of reason. Self.†2 Feuerbach’s philosophical foundation and orientation of the principle of “reality†not only fundamentally reversed Hegel’s concept of reality, but also violently attacked the philosophy of metaphysics from the ontological foundation. Basic establishment. This reversal and attack is not only shocking, but also profound (only the later metaphysical critics such as Kierkegaard, Stirner, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, etc.). All in all, in Feuerbach's philosophical standpoint, the essence of reality and thus reality is not the idea of ​​the super-perceived world, God or speculative thinking, but the directness of direct sensibility or sensibility.
Although this kind of opposition seems to be related to the theme of "reality", since Hegel emphasizes that reality is the only content of philosophy, the disagreement about "reality" has actually become a philosophical struggle. Around the pivot of the rotation. 3 The original construction of Marx's concept of reality originated from the critique of Hegel's philosophy of law, and this critique meant that he began to enter the "general problem of Feuerbach" and adopted a general agreement with Feuerbach. Critical pace. The core of this critical step is to guide the essence of “reality†into the perceptual existence, rather than to the spiritual entity or the speculative idea. The theme of Hegel's philosophy of law is social reality, that is, the existence and essence of society. But this kind of reality is how to be grasped. We take the "ethics" part as an example: this part is divided into three parts, namely, family, civil society and country. In Hegel's view, the abandoned family and civil society are the state, so the state is the true essence and reality of the family and civil society. In other words, just as the real nature of the state is the same as the concept of the state, the concept of the state finds its true philosophical proof in the pure form of absolute concept (in this sense, “the whole legal philosophy is merely a supplement to logic†4 ). Therefore, Marx’s critique of the concept of Hegel's reality on the subject of legal philosophy has two prominent aspects. First, Hegel's understanding of reality is purely upside down on the ontology. The relationship between reality (the relationship between family and civil society) is called phenomenon, and the essential or real see now Karlovett: a revolutionary break from Hegel to Nietzsche's 19th century thinking, 188, 184 page.
Reality is attributed to the concept (national concept, absolute concept). This means: “The concept becomes the subject, and the relationship between the family and the civil society to the reality of the state is understood as the inner imagination of the concept. The family and the civil society are the premise of the state, and they are truly active; In the speculative thinking, this is reversed. However, if the concept becomes the subject, then the subject of reality, civil society, family, 'situation, arbitrary, etc.' becomes the unreality of the concept here, and The objective factor of meaning." 1 Marx imitated Feuerbach, calling this concept of reality a logical, pantheistic mysticism. Second, because Hegel interprets reality as a contradictory movement with speculative thinking as its essence, he regards the process of development, historicality and concreteness of reality as speculative sublation, rational reasoning, and extreme opposites. Intermediary process.
On the contrary, in Marx's view, reality itself contains extreme opposites and the process of unfolding from it, but just as the extreme nature of reality never stays in simple thinking, such extremes are never possible. Reconcile through the reasoning or mediation process of speculative thinking. For example, the extremes of the real reality of the society in the civil society are not just the opposition in the mind, and therefore it is impossible to solve, discard, and reconcile only through the ascending movement of speculative reasoning and mediation. "It is worth noting that Hegel attributed this absurdity of mediating to its abstract logic and thus can be described as non-fictional and uncontested. At the same time, it also describes this mediating role as a logical speculation. The mystery is a rational relationship and a rational reasoning. 2 In terms of the ontological critique of Hegel's legal philosophy, Marx maintains a general orientation with Feuerbach. The essential aspect of "reality" is not the concept, rationality, and speculative thinking, but the direct sensibility of reality is first of all sensibility. The consequences of such a realistic view in the course of the criticism of legal philosophy are: (1) the essence of social existence is not in the state and the concept of the state; (2) on the contrary, the essence of the concept of state lies in the country of existence. And the essence of the state lies in the existential society; therefore, (3) the key to all the problems is: where should we discover the essence of social existence, in other words, if the current real society is "civil society "How should we explore the essence of this social reality and grasp the true "social reality"? It is this major fundamental issue that has opened Marx's political economics criticism. For Marx, political economy is a science that has matured and is completely civil society, both in terms of its nature and its content. Therefore, the essence cannot be readily provided by the “political economics†as intellectual science, but can only be revealed by the exact “criticism of political economyâ€.
It is precisely because the problem here is fundamentally related to the understanding of “social realityâ€, that is, the essential understanding of social reality, so when Marx began his initial critique of political economy in 1844, this A critique is immediately expressed as a re-criticism of the completed metaphysics (Hegelian philosophy).
point. This re-criticism, which was restarted by Marx himself, is directly related to the reconstruction of "social reality." It not only means that the critique of political economy must become a philosophical critique at the same time. If there is no corresponding philosophical criticism, it is impossible to criticize the deepening of political reality in social economics; it also means: in order to reconstruct the reality of society. Really understand that Feuerbach's philosophical criticism and its preliminary principles of reality seem to be inadequate and inadequate. Although Marx may not have been very aware of this at the time, his reopening of the criticism of Hegel's dialectics itself fully demonstrates the absolute necessity of this criticism. 1 indicates how the concept of reconstructing social reality is for him. Fundamentally, it is necessary to establish a fundamental relationship with Hegelian philosophy. Therefore, what needs to be further clarified is: In the intricate relationship with Feuerbach and Hegel, how Marx's view of reality gradually achieves a basic orientation through a double critique, and finally obtains a decisive foundation.
For Marx's view of reality, it is crucial that when he still relied on Feuerbach in 1844 and launched a fierce ontological critique of Hegel's dialectics, he was already on the subject of reality. Beginning to "subtlely" criticize Feuerbach. This initial or potential criticism will soon prove how it becomes the essential aspect and powerful driving force of Marx's reconstruction of reality. As mentioned earlier, one of the main points that Marx called Feuerbach's great merits is that Feuerbach opposes the directness of sensibility and the negative interrogation process of the absolute person, that is, the denial of negation. This undoubtedly means that Marx is in reality. The aspect of the initial agreement with Feuerbach is that reality is first and foremost emotional. But one important question that remains to be solved is: how to understand the negation of the negation that claims to be absolutely positive. It is on this issue that Marx’s understanding of reality begins to surpass Feuerbach. The decisive pace. In Feuerbach, where the negation of negation is merely regarded as the contradiction between philosophy and itself, that is, pure illusion, Marx interprets it as the "abstract, logical, speculative expression" of the historical movement, 2 Metaphysically changed the historical reality of the costume. In other words, Feuerbach regards the truth of denial as merely a contradiction of philosophy, as a pure embarrassment, and thus nothing but "nothing" and Marx grasps its truth as a metaphysical disguise. The reality of reality is the unfolding process, the historical movement, and the dialectical embodiment, even though such reality is completely under the mysticism of speculative philosophy. Therefore, the following assertions of the Paris manuscript are logical: the phenomenology of Hegels, 823, and the final result of dialectics, the greatness of the negation of the principle of promotion and creation, first and foremost, black Geer regards human self-generation as a process, regards objectification as non-objectification, and regards externalization and the sublation of such externalization; it can be seen that he grasps the essence of labor and puts the object of humanity and reality. Therefore, the real person understands the result of his own labor. 1 Thus, the principle of "activity" is a fully developed principle in German classical philosophy, especially in Hegelian philosophy, in the realistic view of the Paris manuscript. As the root seedlings are unstoppable, this root seedling, as the initial but essentially important difference with Feuerbach's view of reality, not only becomes a powerful component of Marx's view of reality, but also contains criticism of Feuerbach. The basic reason.
Therefore, when we see the philosophical transformation based on practice as the fundamental orientation in the follow-up of Feuerbach's outline and German ideology, Marx's view of reality has been firmly established in "perceptual activities" or "objects." The ontological foundation of sexual activity. Reality, for Marx, is not just a direct emotional object of sensibility. Rather, it is a perceptual object that is generated, expanded, correlated, and thus embodied in perceptual activities. As Lovett said, "The existence of society in Marx shows the emotional activity as a social practice." 2 In this sense, Marx's view of reality is also a concept of practice. Because the principle of activity is decisively grasped in the sensibility Therefore, Marx’s understanding of reality immediately manifests itself as the unfolding process of reality, manifested in the historical nature of things, manifested in the concreteness of the existence of the connected reality. This seems to be the return to Hegel’s philosophy, but two The fundamental difference between the two is that Hegel's concept of reality is based on absolute ideas (thinking thinking) and the specific program that is oriented from it; and Marx's view of reality is based on perceptual activities (practice), and This is the specific program of orientation. These two specific programs can be called dialectics, but according to Marx himself, they are "the opposite."
This fundamental difference is prominently reflected in Marx's following proposition: "Consciousness can only be realized at any time, and people's existence is their real life process." '3 precisely because of this ontology The decisive change, Marx was able to grasp the reality as: (1) reality is not the product of the self-activity of the idea, but directly the process of people's real life; just because of the life process through this emotional activity, the human existence and thus the society The reality of reality becomes a real reality. (2) Social reality is not only real, but also the essence of this essence is not in the concept, concept, speculative thinking, but directly in the process of people's emotional life. The universal is the mode of production. "It is the way in which these individuals are determined to be, the way they express their lives, and their certain way of life. "4 This essential aspect of social existence is called by Gadamer as "the production relationship of the basic structure of human society", Karlovy Viter: a revolutionary break from Hegel to Nietzsche's 19th century thinking, p. 188.
Heidegger called it “economic development and the structure needed for such development.†1 (3) Therefore, social reality is essentially a structural entity, and the overall structure is a history. The whole (change structure of production methods) is just like the existence of any kind of human beings or the existence of society is defined in the overall structure of its structure and thus gains meaning. Such existence is only in the overall history of its existence. Generated and changed as a deployment process. In Marx’s view, the single isolated individual atomic individual who left the former and was regarded as the starting point, “the fictitious fiction of the 18th century†left the latter, and formed the social reality in “and The pure illusion of "the history of eternal natural law that has nothing to do with history." 2(4) Just as social reality itself is completely concrete in its structure-history of the whole to achieve its comprehensive concrete example, the true understanding and grasp of social reality must therefore become concrete; that is, unless it It has a comprehensive and concrete program that plays a fundamental role. Otherwise, there is no way to touch the reality, let alone grasp the substantive content of reality itself. When Marx talked about the method of political economy, he outlined this specific program, but it was largely shelved, misunderstood and forgotten. Marx pointed out that the scientifically correct method lies in: "The specific reason is concrete, because it is the synthesis of many regulations, and thus the unity of diversity. Therefore, it manifests itself in a comprehensive process of thinking, as a result, not as a manifestation. The starting point, although it is the starting point of reality, is also the starting point of visualization and representation. On the first road, the complete representation evaporates into an abstract rule; on the second road, the abstraction rules lead to specific in the thinking journey. Reproduction. 3 The whole concrete program of Marx's view of reality contains two paths at the same time: it starts from the specificity of sensibility, and through the abstraction of thinking, it is specific to the mind (with many rules and relationships). Rich overall).
From this we immediately see how far Marx’s view of reality is from Feuerbach. Although the principle of perceptual reality has greatly inspired and promoted Marx, since Feuerbach only understands reality as a perceptual direct "sensible object" rather than a "sensible activity", the reality of reality is only a display. Give simple feelings and simple intuitiveness. In such a sensibility of directness, the so-called reality is almost purely perceptual reality, that is, something that can be directly given to us through feeling or intuition, without including anything truly essential; so that Feuerbach The essence of reality can't say anything of value, or when he wants to talk about this essential aspect, he has to rethink the illusion of speculation. 4 The most important thing is that this theoretical situation completely excludes the process of development, history and materialization from reality, thus completely shrinking the understanding of reality in the appearance of chaos, or ending in the nameless, but It is also abstract in the intuitive. This not only makes the social reality a completely “unreachable area†of Feuerbach, but also makes the “natural†reality only stay in the intuitiveness of the natural science that has usurped the reality. 5 Therefore, it is by Gadamer: Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 114.
The principle of activity, the historicality of the process, and the program of concreteness have all been abolished, so Feuerbach’s philosophy has shown an incredible poverty in the realm of social reality, even as Lovett said, it is a kind of “regressionâ€. "The brutalization of thinking that replaces content with exaggeration and intention. 1 Therefore, in a nutshell, the great revolutionary significance of Marx's view of reality is that it does not depend on the absolute God or the mysterious "the subject and the guest", but completely from the sensibility The world of a perceptual activity, to grasp the reality, to expound the essence of reality. Such an essentiality exists, and it is also a universal person who plays a decisive role in the process of development or the specific itinerary;çš„æ™®é者既ä¸æ˜¯ç†æ™ºçš„抽象规定，也ä¸æ˜¯è¢«ç¥žç§˜åŒ–为â€å®žä½““的æ€è¾¨çš„æ€ç»´ï¼Œâ‘¡è€Œæ˜¯å¹¿ä¹‰çš„生产方å¼æˆ–生活方å¼ï¼Œæ˜¯è¿™ç§ç”Ÿæ´»æ–¹å¼çš„å˜åŠ¨ç»“构。马克æ€çš„çŽ°å®žè§‚ä»Žæ ¹æœ¬ä¸Šæž„æˆå”¯ç‰©å²è§‚的实质。它的影å“是如æ¤çš„广泛而深远，以至于虽然å˜åœ¨ç€ä¸»è¦ç”±å®žè¯ä¸»ä¹‰å®šå‘ 误解和å差，但â€è‡ªæ¤ä¹‹åŽï¼Œè¿™ç§åŽ†å²è§‚也规定ç€éžé©¬å…‹æ€ä¸»ä¹‰è€…å’Œå马克æ€ä¸»ä¹‰è€…çš„æ€ç»´æ–¹å¼ï¼Œç”šè‡³è¶…出他们想知é“的程度。他们都è¦åƒé©¬å…‹æ€é‚£æ ·æŠŠæ¡'现实的生活过程'和并éžæ— å‰æã€è€Œæ˜¯æ°æ°ç›¸å也是æ€ç»´æ–¹å¼çš„å‰ææ¡ä»¶çš„定生活方å¼'.③至于马克æ€çŽ°å®žè§‚çš„æ·±åˆ»ä¹‹å¤„ï¼Œæµ·å¾·æ ¼å°”è¯„è®ºè¯´ï¼šé©¬å…‹æ€åœ¨ä½“会到异化的时候，是深入到“历å²çš„本质性的度â€ä¸åŽ»äº†ï¼Œå› æ¤å…¶åŽ†å²è§‚比其他的历å²å¦æ¥å¾—优越。看æ¥èƒ¡å¡žå°”å’Œè¨ç‰¹ï¼Œä»ŽçŽ°è±¡å¦å’Œå˜åœ¨ä¸»ä¹‰éƒ½æ²¡æœ‰èƒ½å¤Ÿè¾¾åˆ°åŽ†å²äº‹ç‰©çš„本质性；åªæœ‰è¾¾åˆ°äº†é‚£ä¸€åº¦ï¼Œæ‰å¯èƒ½æœ‰èµ„æ ¼å’Œé©¬å…‹æ€ä¸»ä¹‰å¯¹è¯ã€‚在å¦ä¸€å¤„，海æ°åˆè¯´ï¼šâ€œçŽ°ä»Šçš„哲å¦â€åªæ˜¯è·Ÿåœ¨çŸ¥æ€§ç§‘å¦åŽé¢äº¦æ¥äº¦è¶‹ï¼Œå´å®Œå…¨ä¸äº†è§£æˆ‘们这个时代的两é‡ç‹¬ç‰¹çš„现实，å³ç»æµŽå‘展以åŠè¿™ç§å‘展所需è¦çš„架构。 ⑤åªæœ‰ä»Žç¤¾ä¼šçŽ°å®žçš„立场出å‘，æ‰å¯èƒ½çœŸæ£ç†è§£â€œä¸å›½é“è·¯â€
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Bathroom Accessories list
No matter how big or small the space is, the top items on your bathroom supplies list should include:
Mirror.
Wastebasket.
Natural Hand Soap.
Soap Dish.
Bath towels, hand towels, washcloths (2 of each)
Non-skid bath mat 8up.
Toothbrush holder.
Over-the-door and/or wall hooks.
How To Choose The Right Bathroom Accessories
Helpful Tips. ...
Budget. ...
The Layout Of The Bathroom. ...
The Overall Theme Of The Bathroom. ...
Functionality. ...
Bathroom Floor And Wall Finishing. ...
Frequency Of Use. ...
Age Bracket of Users.
Our company have gravity casting machines, CNC machines, grinding flats, high-precision measuring instruments and processing equipments. We also employ a large quantity of technical personnel and management personnel and a very professional sales team which will always respond to your queries immediately. Our products mainly are Basin Faucets, Kitchen Faucets, Shower Faucets and other sanitary ware accessories. Furthermore, we have already passed ISO9001: 2015. "Gain development by quality, Win customer by reputation" is always our aim while coordinated with our clients and has been leading us to the exportation of all over the world.
Others,Chrome And Glass Soap Dish,Wall Mount Soap Dish Holder,Soap Bathroom Holder
Kaiping Jianfa Sanitary Ware Co.,Ltd. , https://www.jfsanitary.com